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For electricity market participants trading in sequential markets with differences in price levels and risk
exposure, coordinated bidding is highly relevant. We consider a Nordic power producer who engages in
the day-ahead spot market and the near real-time balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and
dispatched volumes are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the balancing market, the agent faces
an additional risk of not being dispatched. Taking into account the sequential clearing of these markets
and the gradual realization of market prices, we formulate the bidding problem as a multi-stage stochastic
program. We investigate whether higher risk exposure can explain the hesitation, often observed in practice,
to bid into the balancing market, even in cases of higher expected price levels. Furthermore, we quantify the
gain from coordinated bidding, and by deriving bounds on this gain, assess the performance of alternative
bidding strategies used in practice.
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1. Introduction
With 73% of the total physical power exchange in the Nordic region being traded at Nord Pool
in 2011 (The Nordic blueprint (2011)), this is Europe’s largest and most liquid market place for
electricity. More specifically, Nord Pool operates the day-ahead spot market Elspot for the physical
exchange of production and consumption. This market covers Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland
and Estonia, and had 350 members and an impressive turnover of 294.4 TWh in 20111.
Although the spot market facilitates day-ahead balancing of expected production and consump-
tion, real-time imbalances may still occur. It is the responsibility of the local electricity system
operator, e.g. in Norway, Statnett, in Sweden, Svenska Kraftnät, and in Denmark, Energinet.dk,
to ensure the physical balancing of supply and demand by activation of so-called regulating power.
There exists a common Nordic market for regulating power, referred to as the balancing market,
but trading is through the local transmission system operator. The balancing market has few mem-
bers, e.g. in Denmark only 6, despite a total regulating power supply of approximately 0.75 TWh in
2011 (Personal communication with H. Parbo, Energinet.dk). The hesitation to enter this market
is a major problem, reflected by a total demand for regulating power in Denmark of as much as
3 TWh 2. In general, the need for balancing services is expected to increase with the increasing
growth in fluctuating renewable production, as pointed out by e.g. Holttinen et al. (2008, 2009).
The above electricity market design applies not only in the Nordic region, but analogies to
day-ahead spot and near real-time balancing markets is also found e.g. in the Netherlands and
Portugal/Spain, although with different bidding rules and market setups.
For electricity market participants able to engage in sequential markets such as the Nordic spot
and balancing markets, coordinated bidding is highly relevant. Nevertheless, as already mentioned,
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a hesitation to enter the balancing market can be observed in practice. This motivates the following
research questions: Can the hesitation be explained by differences in price levels and risk exposure
between the two markets? Is it profitable to hold back capacity in the spot market for the balancing
market? If so, what is the gain from doing so?
To answer these questions, we consider a power producer who trades in a day-ahead spot market
and an near real-time balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and dispatched volumes
are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the regulating market, the agent faces an additional
risk of not being dispatched. Taking into account the sequential clearing of these markets and the
gradual realization of market prices, we formulate the bidding problem as a multi-stage stochastic
program.
Our contribution is three-fold:
• We develop a three-stage stochastic programming model for coordinated bidding into two
sequential markets, taking into account market price uncertainty and existing market rules. This
model can be used for market exchange irrespective of production or consumption technology.
• When generating market price scenarios, we put special efforts into preserving autocorrelations
and cross-correlations. Since the separate scenario sampling and reduction approaches suggested
in the literature may alter correlations, we suggest an integrated approach.
• To assess the performance of alternative bidding strategies applied in practice, we derive
bounds on the gain from coordinated bidding. These bounds can be computed without actually
solving the three-stage stochastic coordination problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first provides an overview of electricity market
bidding in the literature. We proceed to introduce the Nordic electricity markets, including the spot
and balancing markets in Section 3, and formulate a three-stage stochastic programming model for
coordinated bidding into these markets in Section 4. Section 5 is concerned with the generation of
market price scenarios that serve as input to the stochastic programming model. We derive bounds
on the gain from coordinated bidding in Section 6, and numerically quantify this gain in Section
7. Finally, Section 8 concludes our analysis and discuss extensions of our model.
2. Electricity market bidding in the literature
The problem of optimal electricity market bidding is an optimization problem under uncertainty,
given that the outcome of market clearing is unknown at the time of bidding. Naturally, the
formulations of and solutions to the bidding problem found in the literature reflect the variety of
approaches to optimization under uncertainty.
One strand of literature is based on optimal control and dynamic programming, and focus on
the characterization and derivation of closed-form solutions to the bidding problem. An example
is Anderson and Philpott (2002), who formulate a non-linear control problem and find necessary
conditions for optimality. In their formulation, the authors make use of a so-called market distri-
bution function, representing the probability that a generator is not fully dispatched at a given
bid price and volume. For a price-taker, this is equivalent to the probability that the bid price
exceeds the realized market price at a given volume, which is also what we use. Whereas an effi-
cient approach to solving the non-linear problem remains an open question, Neame, Philpott and
Pritchard (2003) derive optimality conditions for a hydroelectric reservoir with continuous out-
put range, and solve the bidding problem by a discretization of the range and the application of
dynamic programming. A similar approach is taken by Pritchard and Zakeri (2003), who likewise
find offer curves for hydro reservoirs, and by Pritchard, Philpott and Neame (2005), who decompose
the hydropower optimization into an inter-stage scheduling problem and an intra-stage bidding
problem. In general, it is difficult to handle complex constraints and multiple state variables by
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the optimal control approaches, and the bidding formulations may often account for operational
restrictions only through the reward function, take into account only one market, and do not
include the costs of non-compliance with the market commitments.
In contrast, mathematical programming formulations easily allow for various constraints, and
furthermore, through the extension to stochastic programming, for multiple sources of uncertainty.
Examples of bidding models for price-taking electricity producers are Contreras et al. (2002), Lu,
Chow and Desrochers (2004), Ni, Luh and Rourke (2004), Fleten and Pettersen (2005), Ladu-
rantaye, Gendreau and Potvin (2007) and Fleten and Kristoffersen (2007). These models include
details such as ramping restrictions, capacity limits, storage balances, start-up costs, risk con-
straints etc. Reviews on optimal electricity scheduling and market exchange have been given by
Wallace and Fleten (2003) and Kristoffersen and Fleten (2010).
Here, we extend the work of Fleten and Kristoffersen (2007) to sequential markets. This problem
has already been addressed by Plazas, Conejo and Prieto (2005), who consider bidding into three
sequential short-term markets. As in our case, the authors assume that producer is a price-taker
in the day-ahead spot market and allow for price-making in the real-time balancing market. For
the Nordic markets, contributions include Fosso et al. (1999), who consider production scheduling
with a view towards the spot, regulating and futures markets, and Faria and Fleten (2011), who
focus on the day-ahead Elspot market and intra-day Elbas market. To the best of our knowledge,
very few have explicitly addressed the problem of coordinated bidding into the spot and balancing
markets, the only example we could find being Olsson (2005). Whereas Fosso et al. (1999) model
only price insensitive bids, Plazas, Conejo and Prieto (2005) do not distinguish between the process
of bidding into the balancing market (before market clearing) and the settling of imbalances in this
market (after market clearing), and Olsson (2005) assumes smooth bidding curves instead of the
piece-wise linear curves dictated by the market rules. Furthermore, the above references neither
account for the additional risk of not being dispatched in the balancing market, nor present an
accurate modeling of the settlement mechanism, as we aim to.
With many details and the inclusion of uncertainty, mathematical programming models can be
computationally hard and time consuming. Efforts to efficiently solve the bidding problem have
been made by Klæboe (2011), who resort to Bender’s decomposition, and Nascimento and Powell
(2009) and Loehndorf, Wozabal and Minner (2010), who apply approximate dynamic programming
to integrate scheduling and bidding decisions for energy storage.
As an alternative to approximating the stochastic programming problem by cutting planes or
simulation, we suggest to reduce computation time through careful generation of scenarios. Varia-
tions of scenario generation methods from the literature include Høyland and Wallace (2003) and
Høyland and Wallace (2001), who propose moment/property matching by optimization or simula-
tion. Another commonly used approach is to model the underlying stochastic processes, simulate
a large number of sample paths/scenarios, and subsequently reduce this number by clustering.
Central references on this method are Dupac̆ová et al. (2003), Heitsch and Römisch (2003) and
Heitsch and Römisch (2007) for two-stage programs, Heitsch and Römisch (2009) for multi-stage
programs, and Gröwe-Kuska et al. (2003) for applications to power planning problems. For the
particular case of bidding into sequential electricity markets, see Olsson and Söder (2008), who
include the balancing market. Our scenario generation likewise relies on scenario sampling and
reduction. However, whereas the existing literature handles sampling and reduction separately, we
take an integrated approach designed to preserve the central properties of the stochastic processes.
From a practical point of view, there may be further challenges in implementing and solving the
coordination problem (e.g. since this requires modeling software). This is finally our motivation for
relating its solutions to alternative bidding strategies used in practice, and assessing the gain from
coordination without actually solving it.
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3. The Nordic short-term power markets
We consider two sequential markets common in many electricity market designs: A day-ahead and
a near real-time market. In the Nordic region, these markets are the spot market Elspot and the
balancing market.
The day-ahead market is the spot market for physical trading of production and consumption.
As the name suggests, bidding takes place a day ahead of operation, when the market participants
submit a set of price-volume bids for every hour of the following operation day (disregarding so-
called block bids and flexible bids). For every such hour, the market interprets the set of bids
as a points on a bidding curve. At closure around noon, the market is cleared, i.e. the demand
and supply curves from all market participants are aggregated and the equilibrium is determined.
Usually, bids are dispatched in merit order until aggregated demand and supply matches (however,
taking into account transmission constraints). Bids can either be fully or partially (the marginal
bid) accepted, and the marginal bid determines the market price (in the absence of bottlenecks).
All trades are settled at this market price. Upon market clearing, the market prices for the following
operation day are announced and the market participants are notified of their dispatch. The market
participants are committed to comply with their dispatched volume, and hence must produce or
consume accordingly.
Nevertheless, due to unforeseen events such as the inability to perfectly predict supply or demand
or deliberate (strategic) noncompliance with the market commitments, expected and realized pro-
duction and consumption may not fully match. Usually, an electricity system operator is responsible
for ensuring physical balance of the power system. Hence, when imbalances occur, the system oper-
ator activates additional supply or demand by buying or selling so-called up and down regulating
power. In situations of negative (resp. positive) imbalances, i.e. if real-time consumption (resp.
production) exceeds production (resp. consumption), up (resp. down) regulation is activated.
Up and down regulation is traded in a near real-time market, here referred to as the balancing
market. This market operates along many of the same principles as the spot market. Thus, for every
hour of an operation day, the market participants submits a set of price-volume bids for up and
down regulating power. However, bidding takes place during the operation day, with market closure
being immediately prior to the delivery hour. This makes the market accessible only to agents
that can quickly adjust production or consumption, also known as balance responsible parties.
Furthermore, although bidding is on an hourly basis, the market clearing and subsequent dispatch
occur continuously throughout the operation day, and is usually effectuated by the system operator
irrespective of the origin of demand for regulation. The total volume dispatched, or equivalently
the aggregated net demand for regulation, during the delivery hour determines the sign of the
system imbalance, i.e. whether the system has generally been up and down regulated. This is used
to establish the hourly balancing market price. In situations where the system is up (resp. down)
regulated, it is the price of the most recently activated up (resp. down) regulation bid (as above, in
the absence of bottlenecks). The balancing price is automatically higher (resp. lower) than the spot
price, since less expensive bids have already been dispatched in the spot market. For this reason,
the sign of the system imbalance is revealed from the spot and balancing market prices. If both up
and down regulation bids are dispatched within the same delivery hour, special pricing principles
apply.
For market participants who do not comply with their dispatched volumes in the spot and
balancing markets (in case of trading in both markets), imbalances are penalized. In contrast
to the process of balancing market bidding, imbalances are settled following the delivery hour,
when realized production and consumption has been metered. Depending on the market design, a
one-price or two-price balancing mechanism applies in the settlement. Under a one-price system,
metered imbalances, whether positive or negative, are charged or paid the balancing market price.
If a two-price system has been implemented, negative (resp. positive) imbalances are charged (resp.
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paid) the balancing market price for imbalances of the same sign as net demand for regulating
power, or equivalently the sign of the system imbalance, and otherwise the spot price. Clearly, this
system has been designed to rule out incentives to deliberately create imbalances. As an example,
in Western Denmark, the one-price system has been implemented for consumption, whereas the
two-price system applies to production.
We consider a market participant who submits bidding curves to the spot and balancing markets
over a time horizon of a day. The day is discretized into hourly time intervals according to the
bidding practice in both markets. Although regulation is activated continuously throughout the
delivery hour, we assume that only either up or down regulation is activated within the same
hour, which makes it possible to settle all accounts on an hourly basis. The following assumptions
holds for both markets. When the market participant can decide on both bid prices and volumes,
the problem is non-linear, and we therefore discretize the price range, and fix a number of bid
prices. Moreover, although we will later relax this assumption, we initially assume that the market
participant take market prices as given. This makes it possible to determine a priori whether a
bid is accepted or rejected. We assume that all bids are either fully accepted or rejected (i.e. the
market participant never submits the marginal bid). Finally, we use system-wide market prices,
and ignore any transmission constraints and potential bottlenecks.
As indicated above, both spot and balancing market prices are unknown at the time of bidding
into the spot market. However, once the spot market has cleared, spot market prices are revealed.
Likewise, balancing market prices are unknown at the time bidding into the balancing market,
but are revealed once this market has cleared. Finally, both spot and balancing market prices are
known when imbalances are settled. Taking into account the sequential clearing of the markets,
we formulate the bidding problem a three-stage stochastic program. The first stage consists of
spot market bidding, the second stage of balancing market bidding, and the third stage consists
of imbalance settlement. Note that without operational uncertainty, the problem is a three-stage
program. With such uncertainty, however, the problem in fact has 26 stages (the first stage consists
only of spot market bidding, stage 2–25 of regulating market bidding, operation and settlement of
imbalances, and the last stage consists only of imbalance settlement). However, as our main focus
is spot market bidding, we use a three-stage approximation. By assuming a discrete distribution
of market prices, the gradual realization of uncertainty can be represented by a so-called scenario
tree.
4. The bidding problem
We use the following notation for the bidding problem. A 24 hour operation day is divided into
hourly time intervals [t−1, t], t= 1, . . . , T with T = 24, where the interval [0,1] represents the hour
00 : 00− 01 : 00, [1,2] represents the hours 01 : 00− 02 : 00 etc. In the following, however, we refer
to the time interval [t− 1, t] simply as t.
We denote the random spot and balancing market prices in time interval t by ρt and µt, respec-




t=1 are stochastic processes on some probability
space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra, and P is the probability measure.
This probability space is equipped with a filtration given by the σ-fields F1 = {∅,Ω} ⊆F2 ⊆F3 =F ,
where F2 is generated by {ρt}
T




t=1. Hence, the σ-fields
represents the information available in the first, second and third stages.























t=1 are the corresponding volumes dispatched, {zt}
T
t=1 represents imbalances and {qt}
T
t=1 are
the actual net production levels (a positive level indicates production, a negative level consump-
tion). As for market prices, the sequence of decisions in the bidding problem forms a stochastic
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process on (Ω,F ,P). We assume that this process is adapted to the filtration of σ-fields, or equiva-
lently, that the decisions are non-anticipative. Non-anticipativity implies that decisions made in the
first stage depend only on the information available in the first stage, and similarly for the second
and third stages. Technically speaking, we assume that {xspott }
T
















t=1 both follow a
discrete distribution with a finite support given by a number of scenarios. With the above assump-
tions, the scenarios form a scenario tree. This scenario tree is based on a finite set of nodes N . The
the root node n= 1 makes up the first stage, whereas the second and third stages consist of sets of
nodes denoted by N2 and N3, respectively. Apart from the root node, all nodes have an ascendant
node and a set of descendant nodes. For node n, the immediate ascending node is denoted by n−
and the set of immediate descendants is denoted by N+(n). Hence, for the three-stage scenario
tree, we have that n− = 1 for all n ∈N2 and n− ∈N2 for all n ∈N3, and moreover, N+(1) =N2 and





as a spot price scenario, and likewise each node n ∈ N3 corresponds to a spot price scenario and






t=1. For all n ∈ N the corresponding probabilities are given
recursively by π1 = 1 and πn = πn/n−πn− for n > 1, where πn/n− is the probability that n is the
descendant of n−. The above assumptions further imply that the decisions of the bidding problem
are assigned to nodes such that the first stage decisions xspott are made prior to any realizations,




t=1, n ∈N2 are made following the observation of
{ρnt }
T








t=1, n ∈N3 following







4.1. Spot market bidding
We consider both selling to and buying from the spot market such that the market participant
submits a supply or demand curve for every hour of the following operation day. In any case, we
assume that the bid prices are fixed, i.e. these are parameters, whereas the bid volumes are decision
variables. We let the discretization of the price range be indexed by 1, . . . , I. For a given hour t, the









and the volumes xspot,+it ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I (note that bid volumes are defined as the accumulated
volumes at a particular bid price. Occasionally, we may however also refer to a bid as the incremental
volume). When minimum and maximum bid volumes apply, we denote these by xmin and xmax,
and include the decision variables δ+it ∈ {0,1}, i= 1, . . . , I such that δ
+
it = 1, when x
spot,+
it > 0, and
δ+it = 0, when x
spot,+
it = 0. Likewise, for a given hour t, the demand curve is defined by the prices








It =0, and the volumes x
spot,−
it ≥ 0, i= 1, . . . , I. The
same minimum and maximum bidding volumes apply, with the corresponding decision variables
δ−it ∈ {0,1}, i= 1, . . . , I. Obviously, if the producer could perfectly predict market prices, it would
be unnecessary to submit bidding curves. However, market prices are unknown at the time of
bidding. For this reason the bid volumes are node-independent. Once market prices are known, we
can determine which (incremental) bids are accepted. We denote the total volumes dispatched in
node n by yspot,+,nt , y
spot,−,n
t ≥ 0, so that these decision variables represent the accumulated volume
of accepted supply or demand bids, respectively.
Volumes bid are related to volumes dispatched through the bidding curve. Depending on the
market rules, this curve may be a step-wise bidding curve, for which supply (resp. demand) bids are












i+1t, i= 1, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . , T,n∈N2, (1)
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and on the demand-side
yspot,−,nt = x
spot,−






i−1t, i= 1, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . , T,n∈N2. (2)
Note that for a price-taker, we can determine a priori whether a bid is accepted or rejected, and
express the relation between volumes bid and volumes dispatched as a linear constraint. Alterna-
tively, the market rules may dictate a piece-wise linear bidding curve (this is the case in the Nordic




























i= 1, . . . , I − 1, t= 1, . . . , T,n∈N2,




























i= 2, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N2,






t . In any case, the market rules usually require bidding curves to be









i+1t , i= 1, . . . , I − 1, t= 1, . . . , T. (3)











max, i= 1, . . . , I − 1, t= 1, . . . , T.
For every hour of the operation day, the spot market profit is calculated as the market price times











Note that if the market participant is active only on supply-side, the bid volumes on the demand-
side are fixed to zero, and vice versa.
4.2. Balancing market bidding
As for the spot market, we consider both selling to and buying from the balancing market, and
hence the market participant submits a supply or demand curve for the following hour of operation.
We likewise assume that bid prices are fixed a priori, and for ease of exposition, we use the
same discretization of the price range. For a given hour t, the volumes bid are represented by
the decision variables xreg,+,nit , x
reg,−,n
it ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I, and the volumes dispatched in node n by
yreg,+,nt , y
reg,−,n
t ≥ 0. At the time of bidding into the balancing market, the spot market price is
known, but the balancing market price is unknown. Once both the spot and balancing market
prices are known, we can determine which bids are accepted.
We confine ourselves to step-wise bidding curves (the use of piece-wise bidding curves, however,
follows the same arguments) and consider the relation between volumes bid and volumes dispatched.
In the balancing market, up regulation bids are accepted if the bid price is below the market price
and the system is up regulated, which is revealed from the spot and balancing market prices as
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previously discussed. As mentioned above, in situations where the system is up regulated, the
















0, if µnt < ρ
n−
t
i= 1, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N3. (4)
Again, for a price-taker, we can determine a priori whether a bid is accepted or rejected. Down
regulation bids are likewise accepted if the bid price is above the market price and the system is














0, if µnt > ρ
n−
t
i=1, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N3. (5)
It should be remarked that in the balancing market, the agent faces an additional risk of not being
dispatched, if offering up (resp. down) regulating in situations of a positive (resp. negative) system









i+1t , i= 1, . . . , I − 1, t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N2. (6)
Finally, minimum and maximum bid volumes may also apply. Based on balancing market prices












4.3. Settlement of imbalances
Imbalances occur when total spot and balancing market commitments do not comply with realized
production and consumption. For a given hour t, positive and negative imbalances are represented
by the decision variables z+,nt , z
−,n
t ≥ 0, respectively, and net production by qt ≥ 0. Since imbalances
are settled following the delivery hour, both spot and balancing market prices are known, and thus,
the balancing costs are also known at the time of settlement.















t , t= 1, . . . , T,n∈N3. (7)
Positive and negative imbalances may, respectively, be charged or paid the regulating market price.











A two-price system implies that imbalances are charged or paid the balancing market price when
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t under a one-price system










t } under a two-price system.
Finally, we account for costs of operation. Evidently, operations costs depend on the technology
considered and any restrictions on production or consumption. For now, however, we assume that
these costs are a function of net production
∑
n∈N3
πnO(qn1 , . . . , q
n
T ).
This function is the optimal value of some cost minimization subject to operational constraints, as
will be clear from the following. We note that the objective function and constraints of the bidding
problem are separable with respect to time periods. However, the cost minimization most likely
introduces temporal dependencies through the operational constraints.
4.4. The stochastic programming problem
The three-stage stochastic programming problem of coordinated spot and balancing market bidding
under balancing price mechanism i can be formulated as follows for i=1,2. The first stage consists
of spot market bidding such as to maximize expected future revenues from the actual spot market














In response to the realization of spot market prices, the second stage consists of balancing market
bidding such as to maximize the expected difference between future revenues from actual balancing













: (1), (2), (6)
}
.





µ(yreg,+ −yreg,−)− (γi,−z− −γi,+z+)−O(q) : (4), (5), (7)
}
.













































for i = 1,2. Disregarding the cost minimization, this problem is a linear or mixed-integer linear
program.
4.5. Relaxing the price-taker assumption
So far, we assumed that the market participant is a price-taker. This is a valid assumption for
many spot market participants, but may be questionable for the balancing market, where market
participants tend to be larger players. We therefore relax the price-taker assumption by letting
market prices respond linearly to the volumes dispatched. Denote by ρ̂nt and µ̂
n
t the spot and
balancing prices that realize if the producer or consumer does not participate in the market. The
spot price decreases with increased supply or decreased demand volumes dispatched in the spot
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t ), t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N3,
where αspot, βspot, βreg > 0 are parameters. As an approximation, we incorporate the price response
only in the objective, and use ρ̂nt and µ̂
n
t in the constraints and for the calculation of balancing
costs. For 4αspotβreg > (βspot)2, the resulting problem is a convex quadratic program (as above,
disregarding the cost minimization).





















Since existing market rules (except for maybe the balancing price mechanism) applies to any market
participant, the bidding model can be used irrespective of production or consumption technology.
However, operations costs must be determined by cost minimization for the technology in question.
The aim of the cost minimization problem is to produce or consume in accordance with the market
commitments, while complying with operational constraints. For simplicity, we assume that this
problem is deterministic, and hence, disregard operational uncertainty such as reservoir inflow,
wind power production, availability of generating plants etc. We give a few examples.
4.6.1. Hydro-power In hydro-power operation, the problem is to determine water releases
from a network of reservoirs such as to maximize the final value of water in storage subject to
storage balancing and capacity restrictions. We denote by j = 1, . . . , J the reservoirs, and assume
for simplicity that these are serially connected. The decision variables ljt, vjt ≥ 0 represent the
storage and discharge levels for a given hour t. Upper and lower bounds on storage and discharge






j . Assuming constant water value and electricity
generation efficiency, these are denoted by Vj and ηj , respectively. Finally, in addition to potential
inflows from upstream reservoirs, we assume that all reservoirs have external inflows and denote
the inflow in hour t by νjt. Then, the cost minimization problem is








































j , j =1, . . . , J, t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N3
}
.
Note that the first set of constraints ensure compliance with the market commitments, and so
these commitments can be viewed as a type of demand. For further details on the modeling of
hydro-power operation, see for example Fleten and Kristoffersen (2008).
4.6.2. Thermal generation The thermal generation problem is concerned with the optimal
operation of a number of production units. We denote these units by j =1, . . . , J . Production levels
for a given hour t are represented by the decision variables gjt, and their upper and lower bounds
by gminj , g
max
j . The variable operation cost is denoted by aj. As a result, the cost minimization
problem is
























j , j = 1, . . . , J, t=1, . . . , T,n ∈N3
}
Author: Boomsma, Juul and Fleten, Preprint
11
As above, it should be remarked that the first set of constraints ensure compliance with the market
commitments. This problem may be further subject to ramping restrictions, reserve constraints
and include start-up costs.
By taking into account operational aspects by linear or mixed-integer linear modeling, the bid-
ding problem remains a linear, mixed-integer linear or convex quadratic program.
5. Market price scenarios
We account for uncertainty in spot and balancing prices and for the sign of the system imbalance.
As already indicated, however, the sign of the imbalance is revealed by spot and balancing prices,
and so scenario generation reduces to describing a two-dimensional price process.
Spot and balancing prices exhibit strong autocorrelations and cross-correlations. The former are
highly important for technologies with start-up costs, storage ability, ramping restrictions or other
temporal dependencies in the operational constraints, whereas the latter are obviously relevant to
market participants who engage in both the spot and balancing markets. We therefore put special
efforts into preserving these correlation in the scenario generation.
Our scenario generation relies on scenario tree sampling and reduction. However, whereas the
existing literature handles sampling and tree construction/reduction separately, we take an inte-
grated approach. We describe spot and balancing prices by autoregressive processes that capture
their autocorrelations. Moreover, since spot prices are known at the time of balancing market
clearing, we include spot prices as exogenous variables in the balancing price process, and thereby
also capture their cross-correlations. By sampling current prices conditional on previous ones, we
preserve autocorrelations for both spot and balancing prices. Likewise, by sampling balancing mar-
ket prices conditional on spot prices, we automatically induce the scenario tree structure and at
the same time preserve cross-correlations. To accurately describe the distributions, we generate
a large number of samples, and for computational reasons, we subsequently reduce this number.
The idea is, however, to apply sampling and reduction in a stage-wise fashion in order not to alter
cross-correlations in the process.
The stage-wise scenario generation approach can be summarized as follows:
1. Fit an autoregressive model to spot prices.
2. Fit an autoregressive model to balancing prices that includes exogenous spot prices.
3. Sample a fan of spot price scenario paths for the following 24 hours (second-stage scenarios),
and reduce this fan by clustering.
4. For every spot price scenario path (second-stage scenario): Sample a fan of balancing price
scenario paths for the following 24 hours (third-stage scenarios), and reduce this fan by clustering.
The problem of electricity spot price modeling is a subject of extensive study in the literature,
see for example Nogales et al. (2002), Contreras et al. (2003), Garcia (2005) and Haldrup and
Nielsen (2006), whereas the modeling of balancing market prices is relatively unexplored, a few
references being Skytte (1999) and Olsson and Söder (2008). With only spot and balancing price
data available, structural analysis (e.g. the inclusion of exogenous variables such as consumption),
is infeasible. Like in most of the cited references, we instead fit autoregressive models, although
ignoring more complex characteristics such as jumps, regime switching and volatility clustering.
Prior to model fitting, we adjust for non-stationarity in prices by applying hourly differencing.
Several other specifications were tested, including de-seasonalization and de-trending of the data,
combinations of hourly, daily and weekly differencing, and logarithmic transformation of the data.
However, none of these significantly improved stationarity.
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24 are model parameters,
and the innovations ǫ1t , t= 1, . . . , T are independent and identically distributed N(0, σ
2
1). As above,
several other model specifications were tested, but none were found superior to this model. The
model describes hourly and daily cycles in the data (which are mainly due variations in consumption
patterns).




where φ21 is a model parameter, and the innovations ǫ
2
t , t = 1, . . . , T are identically distributed
N(0, σ22), mutually independent and independent to the above innovations.
To generate second-stage scenarios, we sample a number N of spot price paths {ρnt }
T
t=1, n =
1, . . . ,N from the SARIMA process. We reduce the fan of scenario paths using a clustering algo-
rithm in the spirit of Gröwe-Kuska et al. (2003). Hence, we partition the scenario paths into
k = |N2| clusters by iteratively assigning a path to the cluster in which the shortest distance to
the remainder of the cluster is minimal. Each cluster is represented by the scenario of minimal
distance to the remainder of the cluster. For every node of the resulting second-stage scenario tree
n ∈ N2, we likewise generate third-stage scenarios by sampling a number Nn of regulating price
paths {µmt }
T
t=1,m= 1, . . . ,Nn from the ARMAX process, and apply the clustering algorithm with
k= |N+(n)|.
Upon scenario generation, we check for the existence of arbitrage opportunities. For a given time







t , for all m∈N+(n),
such that sure profits can be made by buying (resp. selling) in the spot market and down-regulating
(resp. up-regulating) in the balancing market. Even for moderate size scenario trees, however, such
situations turn out not to occur. We do allow for arbitrage opportunities that may exist when
buying and selling in different time periods, and from which storage technologies also benefit in
practice.
To fit the time series models in our Nordic case study, we use historical spot and balancing
prices from January 1 2009 - December 31 2010 and obtained from the Danish transmission system
operator Energinet.dk.
The generation of spot and balancing price scenarios is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. For the
two selected days December 14-15 2010, Figure 1 shows historical spot prices for the hours 1-24,
conditional on which future price paths are sampled for hours 25-48. For the same two days,
Figure 2 shows balancing prices, conditional on a given spot price path. The figures to the left
display the sample paths prior to scenario reduction, and those to the right shows the result of
the scenario reduction. For illustration purposes, the shown scenario fans consists of only 20 and
5 scenarios, before and after scenario reduction, respectively.
In our results for the Nordic case study, we generate 100 spot price scenarios and reduce these to
10. Conditional on each of these scenarios we likewise generate 100 balancing price scenarios and
reduce these to 10. Figures 3 and 4 show the autocorrelations and cross-correlations prior to and
as a result of the scenario reduction for December 15 2010. As can be seen from the figures, these
correlations are very well preserved, in spite of having reduced the scenario tree from 100× 100
leaves to only 10×10. Further tests show that the means are likewise well very preserved, whereas
the variances are reduced by the clustering as would be expected.










































































Figure 2 Historical balancing prices (Hours 1-24) and sample paths before (to the left) and after (to the right)
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Figure 3 Autocorrelations in spot and balancing prices before (solid line) and after (dashed line) scenario reduc-
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Figure 4 Cross-correlations between spot and balancing prices before (solid line) and after (dashed line) scenario
reduction (Hours 1-24 corresponds to hours 25-48 in Figures 1 and 2).
6. The gain from coordinated bidding
In this section, we examine the profit gain from coordinated spot and balancing market bidding, or
more specifically, we assess the performance of the separately derived bidding strategies often used
in practice. We do this by deriving bounds on the profits obtained from coordinated and separate
bidding.
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Recall that the optimal value of the coordination problem under balancing price mechanism i is
denoted by zi for i= 1,2.
To resemble that practitioners often derive the bidding strategies separately, we solve the spot
and balancing market bidding problems in a sequential fashion. The spot market bidding problem
















































t= 1, . . . , T,n∈N2
}
, (8)
for i = 1,2. This problem is a three-stage stochastic program. We denote the optimal volumes
dispatched in the spot market by the vectors ȳspot,+,n = (ȳspot,+,n1 , . . . , y
spot,+,n
T ) and ȳ
spot,−,n =
(ȳspot,−,n1 , . . . , ȳ
spot,−,n
T ) for n ∈N2.
In solving the problems sequentially, balancing bidding is conditional on the optimal volumes
























































for n′ ∈N2, i= 1,2. This problem is a two-stage stochastic program.
The expected profit from using the resulting spot market bids provides a lower bound on the
profit from the coordination problem. However, to compute the expected profit from using the spot
market bids, one must solve of 1+ |N2| bidding problems. A much less computationally expensive,
though less tight, lower bound is provided by solving only the spot market bidding problem. This

















≤ zi, i= 1,2.
When the market participant is a price-taker, an upper bound on the profit in the coordination
problem is provided by solving the spot market bidding problem, assuming a one-price balancing
mechanism.
Proposition 2. Assume that ρnt = ρ̂
n




t , n∈N3 (fixed prices). Then,
zi ≤ zspot,1.
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Note that the gain from coordinated bidding can be bounded without actually solving the coor-
dination problem, but by solving at most two spot market bidding problems (under the one-price
and two-price balancing mechanisms).
Propositions 1 and 2 apply irrespective of the balancing price mechanism. When the market
participant is a price-taker, and under a one-price mechanism, however, we can show that one
cannot obtain higher profits through balancing market bidding and, hence, it is sufficient to bid
on the spot market.
Corollary 1. Assume that ρnt = ρ̂
n




t , n ∈ N3 (fixed prices). Then, under a
one-price balancing price mechanism,
z1 = zspot,1.
In the following section, we investigate the quality of the bounds numerically.
7. Results
In this section, we quantify the gain from coordinated spot and balancing market bidding, and
on the basis of the bounds derived in the previous section, assess the performance of alternative
bidding strategies used in practice. Furthermore, we investigate whether higher risk exposure can
explain the hesitation, often observed in practice, to bid into the balancing market, even in cases
of higher expected price levels.
We illustrate the results from the bidding model in a Nordic case study. We consider the spot
market at Nord Pool and the common Nordic balancing power market. As already mentioned, we
use spot and balancing prices from January 1 2009 - December 31 2010 and obtained from the
Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk. In the generation of market price scenarios,
we work with 100 and 10 spot and balancing price scenarios, before and after scenario reduction,
respectively. For the results of the scenario generation, see the previous section. We estimate the
price response parameters from aggregate data and find their values to be αspot = 0.0027, βspot =
0.0057 and βreg = 0.15 Euro/MWh (using a currency rate of 7.5 DKK/Euro), which implies that the
condition for convexity is satisfied. Since the aggregate price response is weak and have little effect
on the results, we investigate the effect of a much stronger price response in our results and multiply
the parameter values by 10. In the optimization of market exchange, the market rules dictate
minimum bids of 0.1 MWh in the spot market, and minimum and maximum balancing market bids
of 10 and 50 MWh, respectively, cf. the documents Trade at the Nordic spot market (2004) and
The balancing market and balance settlement (2008). To illustrate the optimization of operation,
the case study is based on a Norwegian hydro-power plant. We use real data when available, i.e. for
reservoir storage and discharge capacities, generation efficiencies and external inflows. This plant
has two serially connected reservoirs such that upstream water releases contribute to downstream
inflows, and both reservoirs also have an external inflow. We assume that minimum and initial
storage levels are 10% and 50% of full reservoir capacity, respectively. The water value function is
assumed to be piece-wise linear and concave, with a water value of 45 Euro/MWh at 50% of full
reservoir capacity.
The three-stage stochastic programming model has been implemented in the modeling software
package GAMS, and run on a 1.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. Running times are less than a minute
under the price-taker assumption, and so this model can easily be used for daily planning. It should
be taken into account, however, that the modeling of operation could be much more complex,
which will significantly increase running times and justify the scenario reduction. Moreover, the
inclusion of price response increases running time to the proximity of 15 minutes.
The results from the bidding model can be found in Table 1. This table shows the results for
a weekday in the middle of each month (the 15th, or the closest weekday) throughout 2010, and
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assuming a price-taker. The results include empirical means and standard deviations of spot and
balancing prices, profits under a one-price balancing system (the upper bound of Proposition 2,
which we denote UB) and profits under a two-price balancing system, considering respectively spot
market bidding and separate spot and balancing market bidding (the lower bounds of Proposition
1, denoted LB1 and LB2). It further includes the profit from coordinated bidding, the gain from
coordinated bidding ((Profit-LB2)/LB2), the difference between the upper and lower bounds ((UB-
LB1)/LB1), and finally the share of traded balancing market volumes out of total trading volumes.
We observe the following from the results. In our model, very large volumes are traded in the
balancing market (in the reported results, the average is approximately 98%) in spite of lower
average price levels than in the spot market (see columns 1,2, and 10 in Table 1). The explanation
is the significant value of being able to defer the bidding decisions in the balancing market until
an hour ahead of operation. We made further test runs in which the average balancing price is
higher than the average spot price. For example, for December 2010, we increased balancing prices
by 2.5% and found a balancing market volume share of 98.17%, by 5% and found a share of 99%,
and by 10% and found a share of 100%. In spite of higher average price levels, not everything
is necessarily traded in the balancing market. Obviously, this is due to the additional risk of not
being dispatched in the balancing market. As an example, for December 2010, risk adjusted up
regulation prices are only 43.92 Euro/MWh, whereas the spot and balancing market prices are
49.52 and 48.48 Euro/MWh, respectively. Hence, the risk of not being dispatched can to some
extend explain a hesitation to hold back capacity for the balancing market in reality. It is worth
noting, however, that the cost of this additional risk is relatively small compared to the value of
waiting, and so for price increases of 10%, everything is indeed traded in the balancing market.
The profitability in our bidding model of holding hold back capacity for the balancing market
is also confirmed from the bidding curves. In Figure 5, we show examples of optimal spot market
supply curves for two selected hours, using separate and coordinated bidding strategies, respectively
(Note that the small number of steps on the bidding curves is due to the simplistic modeling of
hydropower operation, assuming a constant efficiency and a small number of line segments to define
the piece-wise linear water value function). It is clear from the figure that very large volumes are
traded in the balancing market.
Now, although coordinated bidding is profitable, we observe that the gain from this is relatively
small (in the reported results, the average is around 2%, see columns 7 and 8 in Table 1). Our
results suggest that it is rather this small gain than the additional risk that explains the hesitation
to enter the balancing market. In reality, however, the hesitation may also be caused by substantial
transaction costs (e.g. learning costs) for new entrants in the balancing market. Furthermore, to
prohibit speculation in the balancing market, existing market rules require that physical exchange
of power mainly takes place in the spot market, although no explicit restrictions apply to the
volume allowance in the balancing market. Our model does not capture these aspects. To further
investigate the size of the gain from coordinated bidding, we made additional test runs in which
we increase the difference between spot and balancing price levels. We found that the larger this
difference, the larger the gain. For example, for December 2010, we increased the difference by
125% and found a gain of 1.42%, by 150% and found a gain of 1.87%, and by 200% and found a
gain of 2.92%. The results indicate that coordinated bidding may become increasingly important
in a future power system, given that the expected growth in fluctuating renewable production is
expected to increase the value of balancing power.
Finally, we compute the bounds on the gain from coordinated bidding derived in Propositions 1
and 2 (see columns 3-6 in Table 1). Upper and lower bounds are provided by the profits of the spot
market bidding problem under the one-price and two-price systems, respectively, and the other
lower bound by the profit from separate spot and balancing market bidding. In most cases, we
find the difference between the upper and lower bounds to be a reasonable indicator for the gain
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Table 1 Results for 2010, assuming a price-taker. The table shows empirical means and standard deviations of
spot and balancing prices; profits under a one-price balancing system (UB) and profits under a two-price balancing
system, considering respectively spot market bidding (LB1), separate spot and balancing market bidding (LB2) and
coordinated bidding; the gain from coordinated bidding; the difference between the upper and lower bounds; and
finally traded balancing market volumes out of total trading volumes.
One-price Two-price
Spot price Bal. price Profit Profit, spot Profit, sep. Profit, cor. Gain Gain, pct. (UB-LB1)/LB1 Bal. vol.
Euro/MWh Euro/MWh Euro Euro Euro Euro Euro % % %
Jan 49.52 (17.40) 48.48 (27.55) 8292 7757 7798 7967 169 2.17 6.89 61.41
Feb 39.66 (16.58) 40.59 (26.34) 7448 6887 6972 7207 235 3.37 8.14 68.94
Mar 30.84 (18.09) 30.51 (27.19) 7001 6456 6549 6710 160 2.44 8.44 61.81
Apr 51.99 (16.58) 50.86 (26.04) 8504 8043 8050 8187 137 1.71 5.73 47.96
May 42.98 (19.77) 42.56 (27.99) 7429 6878 6934 7189 255 3.68 8.02 71.19
Jun 60.15 (19.48) 59.97 (28.65) 8941 8502 8507 8645 139 1.63 5.16 51.61
Jul 37.81 (19.40) 38.63 (27.53) 7764 7296 7344 7563 219 2.98 6.42 68.40
Aug 33.81 (17.06) 32.26 (25.79) 7502 6735 6786 6921 135 1.98 11.39 50.42
Sep 47.42 (13.36) 47.45 (24.73) 8168 7712 7736 7901 164 2.12 5.84 56.00
Oct 52.93 (17.59) 51.17 (26.62) 8864 8303 8308 8438 130 1.57 6.75 45.78
Nov 57.53 (12.80) 56.41 (23.97) 9216 8767 8768 8864 97 1.10 5.11 51.40
Dec 74.66 (19.96) 73.88 (28.97) 10469 10055 10056 10161 104 1.04 4.11 36.88
Table 2 Results for 2010, allowing for price response. The terminology is the same as in Table 2.
One-price Two-price
Spot price Bal. price Profit Profit, spot Profit, sep. Profit, cor. Gain Gain, pct. Bal. vol.
Euro/MWh Euro/MWh Euro Euro Euro Euro Euro % %
Jan 49.52 (17.40) 48.48 (27.55) 8240 7748 7779 7855 76 0.97 30.00
Feb 39.66 (16.58) 40.59 (26.34) 7410 6879 6942 7061 119 1.72 42.48
Mar 30.84 (18.09) 30.51 (27.19) 6944 6449 6514 6598 84 1.29 34.78
Apr 51.99 (16.58) 50.86 (26.04) 8446 8034 8039 8099 60 0.75 20.37
May 42.98 (19.77) 42.56 (27.99) 7392 6870 6907 7042 135 1.95 42.57
Jun 60.15 (19.48) 59.97 (28.65) 8891 8493 8497 8555 58 0.68 20.80
Jul 37.81 (19.40) 38.63 (27.53) 7733 7287 7325 7425 100 1.36 38.79
Aug 33.81 (17.06) 32.26 (25.79) 7425 6727 6762 6829 67 0.98 25.25
Sep 47.42 (13.36) 47.45 (24.73) 8113 7703 7722 7798 76 0.98 25.79
Oct 52.93 (17.59) 51.17 (26.62) 8804 8294 8297 8350 53 0.64 20.56
Nov 57.53 (12.80) 56.41 (23.97) 9163 8758 8759 8791 33 0.37 16.63
Dec 74.66 (19.96) 73.88 (28.97) 10408 10046 10047 10086 40 0.40 17.94
from coordination. In particular, assuming a practitioner already solves the spot market bidding
problem, he/she may assess the profitability of entering the regulating market and the gain from
coordinated bidding without actually solving the coordination problem, but merely by solving
two variations of this problem (under the one-price and two-price balancing mechanisms). If the
difference between upper and lower bounds is found to be small, there is no need to formulate and
solve the coordination problem.
For a price-taker under a one-price balancing mechanism, the upper and lower bounds collapse,
and the value of entering the balancing market is zero, cf. Corollary 1. Thus, this market design
provides no incentives for agents to relieve system imbalances. However, the price-taker assumption
is questionable in reality, and so we allow for price response in the results of Table 2. We observe
that much smaller (although still substantial) volumes are traded in the regulating market, when
prices decrease (resp. increase) with up-regulation (resp. down-regulation). For this reason, the
gain from coordination is smaller for a price-making market participant than for a price-taker.
8. Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we proposed a three-stage stochastic programming model for coordinated bidding into
two sequential markets, namely the Nordic spot and balancing markets, and made special efforts
to generate market price scenarios that preserve both autocorrelations and cross-correlations. Our
main objective was to quantify the gain from coordinated bidding, and we derived bounds on this
gain that can computed without actually solving the coordination problem.






































Figure 5 Spot market bidding curves for two selected hours of an operation day, using separate (dashed line) and
coordinated (solid line) bidding.
For our Nordic case study, the bidding model indicates that it would be profitable to hold back
capacity in the spot market for the balancing market. On one hand, it is optimal to trade very
large volumes in the balancing market due to the value of begin able to defer bidding decisions.
One the other hand, not everything is necessarily traded in the balancing market since there is a
risk of not being dispatched in this market. We find the value of waiting to be substantially larger
than the cost of the additional risk, and so the gain from coordinated bidding is relatively small,
suggesting that the incentive to enter the balancing market may be insufficient. In spite of this,
coordinated bidding may become increasingly important in a future power system, given that the
expected growth in fluctuating renewable production is expected to increase the value of balancing
power.
Our model can be improved by the inclusion of risk measures in the objective or constraints
in order to reflect a potential risk aversion of practitioners. Further improvements include more
advanced price models, possibly integrating the bottom-up approaches often used in practice with
our method based on statistics. Finally, our model can be modified to support bidding in other
near real-time markets such as ancillary services markets. Following continuing discussions on the
relevance of a so-called capacity market, an interesting extension of our model is the reservation
of balancing power capacity on longer contracts.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The lower bounds are obtained by deriving feasible solutions.
Since the optimal volumes bid and dispatched in the spot market, x̄spot,+, x̄spot,−, ȳspot,+,n and
ȳspot,−,n for n ∈N2 (the solution to the spot market bidding problem (8)), are feasible solutions to

















If we further restrict the volumes bid and dispatched in the regulating market such that

























































































by recognizing that the next to last term is the optimal value of the spot market bidding problem
(8).
The above holds both when ρnt = ρ̂
n




t , n ∈ N3 (the market participant is a
price-taker) and when allowing for price response (for any functional form of the price response).

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
The derivation of upper bounds is based on a partial relaxation of non-anticipativity.
If we relax the bidding constraints (4)-(6) in the regulating market, we have an upper bound on













































Now, when ρnt = ρ̂
n































































t t= 1, . . . , T,n ∈N3
}
= zspot,1,




1. In comparison, the intra-day adjustment market Elbas, which is likewise operated by Nord
Pool, had 100 members and a turnover of only 2.7 TWh.
2. It should be taken into account that part of the Danish demand for regulating power is usually
covered by import from Norway and Sweden.
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